A World at Nuclear Flashpoint by Michael Costello The Australian 3:04pm 23rd Feb, 2003   February 21, 2003    THE nuclear danger is back. With the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, it seemed that never again could there be a nuclear crisis like that over Berlin, or Cuba, or the rolling crises between the Soviet Union and the US throughout 1983.    But suddenly there is a prospect that over the course of this year we may see nuclear conflict between North Korea and Western nations, and between India and Pakistan.    On North Korea, many experts consider that North Korean scarifying rhetoric should not be taken too seriously. Maybe. I suspect that this is another case, like Iraq, of Western officials and media observers forecasting a country's behaviour on the basis of what we consider rational. This is an analytical flaw that is potentially fatal.    Countries and leaders throughout history have repeatedly acted in a manner entirely rational from their perspective, but lunatic from the outsiders' viewpoint. Witness Hitler's suicidal invasion of Russia and declaration of war on the US.    In talks with North Korean officials in Pyongyang in the early 1990s, it was clear to me that they lived in a parallel universe with a bare connection to the reality of the outside world. So when they say they could defeat the US in a nuclear war, you had better believe they believe it.    The India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir has in no way lessened. There can be little confidence that India, and certainly not Pakistan, has the experience in nuclear command and control to minimise the chance of going nuclear in a crisis situation.    India underestimates Pakistan's capabilities and both sides seem to have low red-line thresholds for using their nuclear weapons. The Indians are not in a mood to listen again to outside urgings for restraint. They did that last year, and consider that Pakistan reneged on its guarantees and has taken advantage of its forbearance. Look for a nuclear confrontation by midyear.    As to the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, Saddam Hussein's utter determination to develop them is recognised in private even by France, Russia and China, although they do not yet seem willing to do what is necessary to stop him.    But Hussein is not alone. Iran is trying. And in light of the North Korean threat, the South Korean President has stated the obvious: if North Korea goes nuclear, so will South Korea and Japan (it would take Japan much less than a year). And if Japan, North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, Israel, Iraq and Iran break out, how long before others join them?    WHY have things come to this? There are those who believe that efforts to stop proliferation are futile, that once the nuclear genie is out of the bottle you can slow the spread but, in the end, not stop it.    The other approach is contained in the non-proliferation treaty. It set out a deal under which those without nuclear weapons agreed not to get them if, and only if, those who had them (at that time, the Soviet Union, the US, Britain, France and China) gave them up.    And there's the rub. Australia was a leader in trying to get India and others to commit to non-proliferation. The Indians would say they would agree if the Americans and other nuclear powers got rid of theirs. After all, they would say, what was so special about the nuclear powers as nations that they should have these weapons forever and countries such as India never.    When reminded of their own obligations under the NPT to get rid of nuclear weapons, the Americans and British had the grace to at least shuffle their feet awkwardly. The French, of course, would harrumph indignantly at the idea. The Indian case may have been self-serving, but it was unanswerable. In the end, either no one will have nuclear weapons or everyone who can will have them. Any general policy of pre-emptive military action against any country developing nuclear capabilities is unsustainable.    Is there another way? President Ronald Reagan astonished the world when he proposed total disarmament of offensive nuclear weapons to Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev at the Reykjavik summit in 1986. Reagan believed that the possession of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, although short-term necessities, were immoral as long-term strategies because of the inherent destructive capabilities of such weapons.    Even if the US does not share Reagan's moral view, it should follow his call for utterly pragmatic reasons. A world in which scores of countries had nuclear weapons would be extraordinarily dangerous, even for the US superpower. The re-emergence of the nuclear danger gives the Australian Labor Party the chance for good policy and good politics. It can expand the debate over Iraq beyond defence and security to nuclear disarmament.    Paul Keating was following in a great Labor tradition when he established the Canberra Commission to work for nuclear disarmament. The Australian Labor could do a lot worse than revive and reinvigorate his ideas as an inspiration to the hundreds of thousands of Australians who demonstrated for peace last weekend.    Michael Costello is former chief of staff to former Australian Labour leader Kim Beazley. Visit the related web page
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