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	The Struggle for Land Reform in India by Rajagopal P.V. The Rules & agencies India   Apr 2013   The government of India made a remarkable promise on October 11th last year. It was bold and broad, and it has the potential to strike a fundamental blow at the plague of landlessness and poverty that blights millions of Indians.   The agreement is nothing less than a package for fundamental reform of India’s land laws. It was signed by the Rural Development Minister, Shri Jaiman Ramesh, and represents a new high-water mark in this government’s ambitions for land justice. But it did not come easily. The final document was signed only after 50, 000 people marched on Delhi, in the Jan Satygraha (using the Sanskrit for ‘peaceful soul force’, this is a broad movement of civil society groups that follow in Ghandi’s tradition of non-violent protest).   The agreement is based on a 10-point plan developed through years of patient work by myself and many others, travelling the country, working with thousands of communities and hundreds of thousands of individuals to understand the problems that underpin landlessness and land-related poverty, and what was needed to fix them.   The demands have thus emerged from the country and its people; from the poor and landless; the women who have lost all their rights once their husband dies; the farmers who cannot farm because their land has been taken from them by corporate developers, without their consent and without compensation; and from the marginalised castes who, for centuries, have been forced to accept a position in society that keeps them beholden to others for their livelihood.   If implemented, the agreement will mean millions of people can start supporting themselves on their own small plots of land. It will give fresh life to long neglected legislation that should be protecting the rights of poor and marginalised communities, like the Land Reform Acts from the 1950s and the more recent Forest Rights Act of 2006. Most importantly, it will require state and national governments to work together in new ways to ensure landless poor and marginalised people can secure their rights.   There is no doubt that this is a daunting promise for the government to make. Land rights touch on so many parts of Indian life – it is not only the lifeblood of the local and village economy, but it is critical to many vested interests, and becoming more so as global pressure for land intensifies. As such, land deals are often mired in corruption, and the political and social complexities can appear overwhelming.   But it must be remembered that, despite all of the economic and financial interests who will inevitably resist change, for the vast majority of Indians, land is life. Land is our shelter, security, identity, home. For farmers, it is the bedrock of a self-sufficient livelihood. In towns and cities, land and a secure home are the only sure way to establish an identity and connect to society and economic opportunity. Equitable access to land for the poorest and most marginalised is an essential pre-condition to a stable and prosperous society.   We call on the Indian government to meet its promises. It has shown more leadership on this issue than many of its predecessors but so far it has only made a start. It cannot falter at this critical moment.   Without doubt, substantial progress has been made on delivery of the 10 point reform plan. There’s still a long way to go, so perhaps the most important achievement is that the issue is high on the political agenda ahead of the 2014 General Election.   * Rajagopal PV, established the peoples organization, Ekta Parishad in 1991. The organization is focused on people`s control over livelihood resources in an environment where land rights are weak, and where forest rights are not being implemented. www.ektaparishad.com/
	Make Inequality History? by Duncan Green   China and India are building their welfare states   A new paper by Arjan de Haan shows the last 15 years of social policy initiatives in China and India, and their large scale.   Though social spending in both countries appears rather low, and many deficits remain in terms of effective social protection, social policies in both countries are evolving rapidly, with, for example, in China the world’s largest rural medical insurance programme, and in India the national rural employmentguarantee scheme (NREGA). Policies vis-ŕ-vis minorities are integral parts of countries’ social policies, consistent with broader approaches, and in turn creating the conditions for state–citizen as well as market relationships.   Political and institutional differences between the two countries have a big impact on how social policies evolve, of course. In China, social policy reforms are directly driven by the large-scale privatisation which created large gaps in social protection and growing inequalities and social unrest.   The public policy choices made in the process are the outcome of political contestation— as they are elsewhere—in turn having significant implications for state–citizen relations. While striving towards universal coverage, China’s social policy choices show strong elements of a ‘productivist’ orientation, keeping social spending low (despite the stimulus package after the financial crisis) and, for example, poverty alleviation programmes focusing on enhancing productivity and economic transformation.   China’s government balances centralized decision-making with a process of piloting before rolling out national schemes. Local governments have a critical role in implementation, reinforcing the focus on economic investment and keeping social investment low, particularly in poorer regions.   Approaches in India show remarkable differences from those in China, driven partly by history, partly by political differences —though social spending in India too has remained low. Despite an ideology of universalism, social programmes are often targeted. Political pluralism and ‘vote-bank politics’ have contributed to manifold and often uncoordinated schemes. India’s social policies have a much stronger emphasis on ‘welfarism’ than China’s— protecting livelihoods or well-being, with less attention to economic transformation—for example, in terms of promoting a rural–urban transition.   Like China’s, and perhaps inevitable given the size of both countries, India’s social policies are implemented through decentralized structures, with notable successes in terms of enhancing citizens’ participation in implementation, but also potentially under-serving the poorest areas and increasing fragmentation.   ‘Though social spending in both countries appears rather low, and many deficits remain in terms of effective social protection, social policies in both countries are evolving rapidly, with, for example, in China the world’s largest rural medical insurance programme, and in India the national rural employment guarantee scheme (NREGA).   Political and institutional differences between the two countries have a big impact on how social policies evolve. In China, social policy reforms are directly driven by the large-scale privatisation which created large gaps in social protection and growing inequalities and social unrest. The public policy choices made in the process are the outcome of political contestation— as they are elsewhere—in turn having significant implications for state–citizen relations. While striving towards universal coverage, China’s social policy choices show strong elements of a ‘productivist’ orientation, keeping social spending low (despite the stimulus package after the financial crisis) and, for example, poverty alleviation programmes focusing on enhancing productivity and economic transformation.   Approaches in India show remarkable differences from those in China, driven partly by history, partly by political differences —though social spending in India too has remained low. Despite an ideology of universalism, social programmes are often targeted. Political pluralism and ‘vote-bank politics’ have contributed to manifold and often uncoordinated schemes. India’s social policies have a much stronger emphasis on ‘welfarism’ than China’s— protecting livelihoods or well-being, with less attention to economic transformation—for example, in terms of promoting a rural–urban transition.   Like China’s, and perhaps inevitable given the size of both countries, India’s social policies are implemented through decentralised structures, with notable successes in terms of enhancing citizens’ participation in implementation, but also potentially under-serving the poorest areas and increasing fragmentation.’   And if you found that a bit hard to take in, here’s my translation of the interesting bits:   1. China and India are introducing basic (low cost) welfare systems on a massive scale, and very fast   2. China initially tried privatising everything, and services collapsed, risking a potential political backlash. So the government jumped into building a welfare system, but wants to keep its eyes on the prize – economic growth. Social policy is about creating healthier, better educated factory workers.   3. India’s more complicated, with a lot of rhetoric about rights, less of a focus on churning out the next generation of workforce (or on where they live), and politicians trading welfare concessions for votes on a small scale, creating an unholy mess overall. India’s deep rooted caste system means decentralization can lead to the lower castes being ignored by the incipient welfare state.   Of course quantity does not mean quality. Lots of criticisms for corruption and inconsistency – e.g. receiving different payments depending on where you are registered, but still an extraordinary transformation.   * Paper by Arjan de Haan: http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper110.pdf   http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=15309   I recently spoke at a Brussels conference on inequality, organized by the Belgian NGO coalition 11.11.11. Inequality is the focus of the month right now, showing surprising staying power within the post-2015 process and elsewhere.   Inequality is all about relationships (a single individual can’t be unequal!), meaning a greater emphasis on power and politics within/between countries.   Inequality is a universal challenge – within countries, it involves everyone; internationally it obliterates North-South distinctions.   That in turn means ‘whole of society’ interventions become more important: aid agencies would do more on norms (do children have rights?); prejudice and discrimination (eg against women, indigenous, disabled); disabling environments (eg violence; market failures that exclude poor people);   Inequality is structural – what kind of economy do we have/want? What’s balance between disequalizing sectors (finance, extractives, capital intensive agriculture) and equalizing sectors (smallscale ag, labour intensive manufacturing, smallscale retail)   In terms of specific themes:   Taxation is the standout issue. A focus on the distributive imapct of how governments raise reveneue would be a necessary complement to the traditional focus on how they spend it. At the moment, there’s real potential for reforming the global system of tax evasion. But at national level, many tax systems are going in a regressive rather than progressive direction.   More focus on ratchet mechanisms that drive up inequality – eg hyperinflation or shocks when the rich typically have more access to smoothing mechanisms (credit, social protection)   Would there be a focus on ceilings as well as floors, eg on land ownership (South Korea) or Oxfam’s recent proposal for an end to ‘extreme wealth’?   The shift to a more overtly political and relational approach to development might be welcome by campaigners (if not by their fundraisers), but it won’t be easy. INGOs and (even more) official donors would have to learn to strike a fine balance between becoming more explicitly engaged on issues of power, politics and redistribution, and being thrown out for meddling in internal politics. There are ways to do this:   Work with and through local partner organizations and curb any messianic tendencies in our own staff.   Focus on the ‘enabling environment for redistribution’ (promoting norms and values for social cohesion, rule of law, governance, access to information, freedom of expression), rather than specific redistributive campaigns that might prompt a greater backlash.   Build the state’s capacity to redistribute (eg domestic resource mobilization): this includes supply (training, technical assistance), demand (eg citizens watchdogs) or a mixture of both.   Develop skills in ‘convening and brokering’, ensuring the voices of poor people and their organizations are at the table by bringing together dissimilar players to build trust and find collective solutions.   Which all makes me think that Make Inequality History faces some pretty big challenges:   Compared to specific campaigns, society-wide interventions are a lot harder to communicate and inspire people about: ‘what do we want? New norms!   A shift to a more universalist and political project could seriously damage levels of political and financial support for aid agencies, where it is currently based on a rather unthinking (and disingenuous) ‘aid is about helping people, not politics’ narrative.   Many of these things demand skills more than cash – aid, with its pressure on a small number of aid agency staff to disburse large chunks of funding, may even be counterproductive to the long-term, subtle political engagement required to tackle the structural roots of inequality.   This was definitely the trickiest question for those in the room in Brussels – can aid agencies find a way to spend the money, and still free up brain time for the more politically sophisticated, long term, rooted work needed to confront inequality? If not, is the conclusion that more money is a mixed blessing? Or can we divide up our approaches into aid-dependent low income countries (business as usual) and non-aid dependent unequal countries (new inequality lens, needing less money and more knowledge)?   If engaging in domestic redistributive processes proves just too politically risky and complex for aid agencies with large budgets and limited attention spans. What about a renewed focus on global inequalities – collective action problems such as climate change, tax havens, trade, inequality-swimming-poolsintellectual property rights, migration? But here the obstacles to change often seem even greater (contrast dynamic national progress with multilateral paralysis on numerous issues).   Conclusions? This is still churning around in my head, but it feels to me like MIH would be right but difficult, banging up against all kinds of institutional constraints including communications, fund-raising and coalition-building. A three tier approach might well emerge:   Make Poverty History: ‘Business as usual’ poverty reduction in low income, aid dependent countries   Make Inequality History: A more politically engaged MIH in middle income and other fast-growing countries with falling aid dependence   Make Externalities History: A global campaign for collective action on climate change, tax havens, intellectual property, arms trade etc.   So over to you. With limited resources, and taking into account both the opportunities and the obstacles to success in each, which of the three approaches should aid agencies adopt? And to avoid the ‘both, and’ syndrome, you’re only allowed to vote for one option.   And here is the undoubted highlight of the Brussels show, ‘India’s first youtube star’ Wilbur Sargunaraj with the catchiest song I’ve heard on poverty and redistribution. OK, the only song, see link below.   * Duncan Green, is a strategic adviser for Oxfam GB and author of "From Poverty to Power". http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/ http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/   http://blogs.oxfam.org/en http://firstperson.oxfamamerica.org/ Visit the related web page
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